FORSEY NOTE FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

6/14/2013 12:57 AM

STATE LEGISLATURES STAND UP FOR
SECOND AMENDMENT GUN RIGHTS WHILE
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT REFUSES TO ORDER
A CEASE FIRE ON THE ISSUE
Logan A. Forsey*
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 412
I.
United States Supreme Court Second Amendment
Jurisprudence ........................................................................... 414
A. District of Columbia v. Heller: Does the Individual
Have the Right to Bear Arms? ............................................ 414
B. McDonald v. City of Chicago: The Second Amendment
Applies to the States ........................................................... 416
II.
Lower Court Challenges ........................................................... 418
A. Introduction to Federal and State Challenges ................... 418
B. Standards of Review: How Should the Lower Courts
Evaluate Second Amendment Challenges? ........................ 419
C. Is Conduct Outside of the Home Protected by the
Second Amendment?........................................................... 420
D. How Are State Courts Reacting to the Assault on their
Gun Restriction Statutes? ................................................... 422
E. Civil Suits Against State and Local Governments .............. 423
F. Going Forward: Further Challenges in Lower Courts ...... 426
III. Legislative Response: “Guns-at-Work” State Laws Expand
Gun Rights for Employees ....................................................... 427
A. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 Proves
Inadequate and Ambiguous ................................................ 427
B. State Legislatures Take a Stand: State “Guns-at-Work”
Laws ................................................................................... 429
1. “Guns-at-Work” Laws in General ................................. 429
2. Oklahoma’s “Guns-at-Work” Law ............................... 430
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Political
Science, Minors in English and Spanish, Seton Hall University, 2010. The author
would like to thank Professor Ronald J. Riccio for his steadfast guidance as well as
Jason D. Angelo, Erik E. Sardiña, Amanda M. Munsie and the members of the
Seton Hall Legislative Journal for their editorial assistance. This Note is dedicated
to the author’s family.

411

FORSEY NOTE_FORMATTED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

412

IV.

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

6/14/2013 12:57 AM

[Vol. 37:2

3. Florida’s Legislation...................................................... 431
4. Indiana: Parking Lot 2.0 ................................................ 433
Conclusion: The Supreme Court Needs to Take an
Affirmative Stance .................................................................... 434

INTRODUCTION
At a young age, we are taught that the Bill of Rights, specifically
the Second Amendment, gives each American citizen the general right
to bear arms. The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
states that “a well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
1
infringed.” Taking this at face value, most Americans never question
exactly how far this right extends until they are forbidden from
obtaining a license or persecuted for carrying a weapon in a prohibited
area. In 2008, the United States Supreme Court, in District of Columbia
v. Heller, acknowledged and confirmed this individual right to bear
2
arms and further elaborated that statues banning handgun possession in
3
one’s home for immediate self-defense violate the Second Amendment.
In 2010, the Supreme Court once again rallied behind the right to bear
arms and concluded, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, that the Second
4
Amendment is fully applicable to the states. The Heller and McDonald
decisions declined to expressly determine whether their holdings limited
the Second Amendment solely to self-defense in the home or whether
the right could be extended to other places.
As a result of the Court’s refusal to establish a standard for
addressing Second Amendment challenges, lower courts continue to
5
struggle over how far to extend an individual’s right to bear arms.
Proponents of gun rights have been challenging state and federal gun
laws since 2008 and cases continue to line up for the U.S. Supreme
6
Court. Although many gun rights activists believed that Heller and
1

U.S. Const. amend. II.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
3
Id. at 636.
4
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3025 (2010).
5
Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12,
2011, at 2.
6
Robert Barnes, Cases lining up to ask Supreme Court to clarify Second Amendment
rights,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST,
Aug.
14,
2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/cases-lining-up-to-ask-supreme-court-to-clarifysecond-amendment-rights/2011/08/11/gIQAioihFJ_story.html.
2

FORSEY NOTE_FORMATTED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

6/14/2013 12:57 AM

2013] STATE LEGISLATURES AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT 413
McDonald were tremendous victories for an individual’s right to gun
possession, later decisions have not clarified Second Amendment rights,
7
keeping gun activists on an overall losing streak in the lower courts.
While the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to confront the issue of
Second Amendment rights outside of the home, state legislatures have
taken a different approach than lower courts by enacting laws that tackle
this challenging issue. Beginning in 2004, gun rights advocates such as
the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) began lobbying state
legislatures to establish laws that prohibit employers from maintaining
gun-free workplace policies under the Federal Occupational Safety and
8
Health Act of 1970 (“OSH Act”). Since 2004, nineteen states have
9
enacted these laws, commonly known as “Guns-at-Work” laws, which
prohibit employers or business owners from forbidding the presence of
otherwise legal guns in locked motor vehicles parked on business
10
premises.
This Note argues that, because of the overwhelming need for
clarification and state legislatures’ proactive stance, the U.S. Supreme
Court needs to take an affirmative stance on the debate regarding how
far the Second Amendment right to bear arms extends. The lobbying
efforts of the NRA will continue to establish “Guns-at-Work” laws, as
advocates continue to put pressure on state legislatures. Since Heller
and McDonald sparked the debate over Second Amendment rights,
cases have been piling up in the lower courts and legislatures have
continued to step into the arena with their own interpretation of gun
rights. With the disconnect between the state enactments and the lower
court rulings, the Supreme Court must affirmatively decide, once and
for all, whether the Second Amendment extends beyond the home.
Part I of this Note discusses the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in
Heller and McDonald by analyzing exactly which questions the Court
answered and which standards they left open to interpretation. Part II
7

Id.
Neil D. Perry, Employer Firearm Policies: Parking Lots, State Laws, OSHA, and the
Second Amendment, 20 EMPLOYMENT LAW COMMENTARY (Morrison & Foerster LLP, San
Francisco, CA), no. 7, July 18, 2008 at 1.
9
Joe Palazzolo, Gun Showdown at Work, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2012,
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578123640080351414.ht
ml?mg=reno64-wsj. In the article, the author states that “about 20 states have passed socalled parking-lot bills since 2004.” By looking at the map that is included in the article, one
can see that 19 states have passed the bills and the author was rounding up to 20.
10
Debra Witter, Individual Gun Rights, Gun Laws, and Franchising: Why Franchisors
Cannot Ignore the Controversy, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 239, 240 (2010).
8
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examines the lower court challenges that have inevitably emerged since
the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in Heller and McDonald.
Part III evaluates the different approaches that state legislatures have
taken to the issue of Second Amendment rights. Finally, Part IV
analyzes the stance that the Supreme Court needs to take in this ongoing
litigation in order to conserve judicial resources. In the five years that
have passed since the Heller decision in 2008, states have continued to
proactively modify their laws to increase gun rights. The Supreme Court
gave a limited definition of Second Amendment rights that spawned the
increased litigation that we see today. The Supreme Court opened the
door for such controversy over the right to bear arms, so it is the Court’s
duty to determine how far these rights should extend.
I.

United States Supreme Court Second Amendment
Jurisprudence

The justices in Heller specifically stated that the Second
Amendment does not allow an individual to carry a firearm for any
11
reason and in any manner. The Court determined that individuals have
12
a right to carry an assembled weapon in their homes for self-defense;
however, they noted that their opinion should not cast doubt on a
13
specified group of gun prohibitions. As a follow up in McDonald, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Second Amendment is fully
14
applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the Court had taken a proactive step to answer one of the
unanswered questions from Heller, they refused to resolve the dispute
over the breadth of the Second Amendment and the standard that should
apply to Second Amendment litigation.
A. District of Columbia v. Heller: Does the Individual Have
the Right to Bear Arms?
Since 1976, the District of Columbia had in place a gun control law
that “banned the possession of handguns and required that all firearms
15
kept in the home be trigger-locked or disassembled.” Initially, the
Supreme Court in 2008 held that the Second Amendment gives an
11
12
13
14
15

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
Id. at 635.
Id 626-27.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3088 (2010).
Perry, supra note 8, at 5.
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16

individual the right to keep and bear arms. Furthermore, the Court
concluded that statutes such as the one in the District of Columbia,
which ban possession of a gun in the home, are in direct violation of the
17
Second Amendment. To that end, the Heller Court ultimately
established that statutes which prohibit an operable firearm in the home
18
for self-defense violate an individual’s right to bear arms. Although it
appeared to be an enormous victory for gun rights lobbyists, the Court
did not stop there.
In his majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia specified that the
Second Amendment is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon
19
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” In
essence, the Court conferred a right to bear arms upon individuals and
then limited that right. The majority explained that their opinion should
not cast doubt on laws that have been in effect for many years and ban
20
possession of firearms “by felons and the mentally ill,” or prohibit
firearms in specific places such as “schools and government
21
buildings,” or impose “conditions and qualifications on the commercial
22
sale of arms.” Activists would have preferred that the Supreme Court
did not include what they believe to be an unnecessary “laundry list of
Second Amendment exceptions,” and, as an executive director with the
Cato Institute explained, the opinion created “more confusion than
23
light.”
More important than the answers that the Heller Court attempted to
establish are the ones that the case purposely left unanswered and open
to interpretation. First, the Court specifically did not establish a standard
that lower courts could use when interpreting gun control laws, as the
Court would not definitively state whether gun control laws should be
viewed under a rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny
24
standard. Second, because the Court’s decision in Heller was about the
16

Heller, 554 U.S. at 570.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 626.
20
Id. at 626-27.
21
Id.
22
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
23
Adam Winkler, The New Second Amendment: A Bark Worse Than Its Right, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 2, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/the-newsecond-amendment_b_154783.html.
24
Perry, supra note 8, at 6.
17
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District of Columbia’s federally controlled territory, there was no
determination as to whether the Second Amendment should apply to the
25
gun laws in each state. Additionally, the Court would not address
whether its holding limited the Second Amendment solely to selfdefense inside of the home or whether it could be further extended to
26
other places, such as public parks or employer parking lots.
Consequently, the decision in Heller was seen as a “green light”
for gun rights activists to challenge gun restrictions in states throughout
27
the country. Essentially, every person charged with a crime involving a
28
gun “saw the Supreme Court’s decision as a Get out of Jail Free Card.”
These litigants assumed that the Heller decision gave them the
opportunity to challenge gun laws that they believed violated their right
to bear arms. The litigants found support in gun rights activists such as
the NRA, who began clogging the legal system with gun law challenges
in an effort to expand the right to bear arms. Unfortunately, the Heller
decision had not made any definite determination about gun rights
outside the home and its inconclusiveness has forced the lower courts to
interpret its holding in countless cases since 2008.
B. McDonald v. City of Chicago: The Second Amendment
Applies to the States
In the midst of the lower court challenges following Heller, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2010 to a case involving a Chicago
29
ban on handgun possession by almost all private citizens. The
McDonald suit was filed because the petitioners felt that the Chicago
ban “left them vulnerable to criminals . . . and violated the Second and
30
Fourteenth Amendments.” Because Heller had not reached the issue of
whether the Second Amendment applies against the states, the Seventh
31
Circuit originally upheld the ban as being constitutional. In support of
their position, the Seventh Circuit stated that Heller “explicitly refrained
from opinion on whether the Second Amendment applied to the

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id.
Id.
Barnes, supra note 6.
Winkler, supra note 23.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3021 (2010).
Id.
Id.
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32

States.” The Supreme Court, however, took the discussion much
further.
In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Seventh Circuit and held that the Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms is fully applicable to the States by virtue of the
33
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court elaborated only slightly on the
Heller decision, declaring that because Heller protected the right to
have a gun for self-defense in one’s home, “a provision of the Bill of
Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an American
perspective applies equally to the Federal Government and to the
34
States.” This decision was important because it extended “Heller to
apply to state and local laws nationwide, while again cautioning that
35
there are necessary limits on the right to bear arms.” The key questions
left open in Heller concerned the level of scrutiny that should be applied
to Second Amendment challenges, and “whether or to what extent the
36
Second Amendment should apply outside of the home.”
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that the majority’s
approach awards power to people and the democratic process because
“the rights it fails to acknowledge are left to be democratically adopted
or rejected by the people, with the assurance that their decision is not
37
subject to judicial revision.” Justice Scalia was correct in his assertion
that the breadth of the right to bear arms can be and has been decided by
the legislature in many situations. Only nineteen legislatures, however,
have given employees more gun rights on their commute to work. The
lack of judicial affirmance of gun rights has left citizens without very
much success when attempting to uphold their rights in judicial
proceedings. When the McDonald Court acknowledged the role that the
legislatures play in regulating gun possession, they were not making an
exact determination of gun rights, but rather, they were avoiding the
controversy altogether. The McDonald Court, as they had done two
years prior in Heller, refused to establish a standard for gun rights
litigation or to determine how far gun rights extend, and their limited
32

Id.
Id. at 3050.
34
Id.
35
Daniel Vice & Kelly Ward, Hollow Victory? Gun Laws Survive Three Years After
District of Columbia v. Heller, Yet Criminals and the Gun Lobby Continue Their Legal
Assault (Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence), 2011, at 1.
36
Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 9.
37
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058.
33
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holding only furthered lower court battles.
II.

Lower Court Challenges

The significant questions that were left unresolved have forced the
post-Heller courts into more than 400 challenges to gun laws by gun
38
lobbyists. Although these challenges generally do not yield positive
39
results for the lobbyists, they continue their assault on gun laws in the
hopes of gaining more gun rights for individuals. Until the Supreme
Court takes an affirmative stance on how far Second Amendment rights
extend outside of the home, lobbyists will continue to use judicial
resources to litigate gun rights cases. Proponents of gun rights feel as
though the unanswered questions from the two Supreme Court decisions
opened the door to challenging gun laws and they continue to assemble
40
cases that ask the Supreme Court for further clarification.
A. Introduction to Federal and State Challenges
In the months following the decisions in Heller and McDonald,
federal and state courts struggled with the unresolved questions about
41
the latitude and application of the Second Amendment. Since the
Heller ruling in 2008, criminals and gun lobbyists alike have joined
together and “brought more than 400 challenges to gun laws, an average
of more than two legal challenges every week over the last three
42
years.” Yet, in a majority of instances, the lower courts have denied
43
any request for relief in these cases. Although these challenges in the
lower courts have generally failed, gun rights advocates continue to
launch new challenges and do not appear to be giving up their fight
44
anytime soon.

38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Vice, supra note 35, at 1.
Id.
Barnes, supra note 6.
Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 2.
Vice, supra note 35, at 1.
Id.
Id.
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B. Standards of Review: How Should the Lower Courts
Evaluate Second Amendment Challenges?
The Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald did not provide the
lower courts with any guidance in how to evaluate Second Amendment
45
challenges following their decisions; therefore, the federal and state
courts have been interpreting what they believe to be the standard of
scrutiny on a case-by-case basis. Most of the courts that have accepted
this task have explicitly adopted one of the levels of scrutiny and have
generally “applied intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment
challenges, especially challenges to laws that restrict conduct beyond
the right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess a handgun in
46
the home for self-defense.” At the same time, a few of the courts that
have taken on the issue have determined that a higher level of scrutiny,
strict scrutiny, should be used to review Second Amendment
47
challenges. It is clear that without guidance from the Supreme Court,
lower courts are left with inconsistent rulings regarding what level of
scrutiny should be applied in Second Amendment cases.
One example of a court holding that intermediate scrutiny is
sufficient can be found in Kachalsky v. Cacace, decided by the United
48
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The
District Court rejected a “Second Amendment challenge to a New York
law that requires applicants for concealed carry licenses to show ‘proper
49
cause.’” Using a two-pronged test, the Kachalsky court first
determined whether the law at issue burdened conduct that was
protected by the Second Amendment, and then applied intermediate
50
scrutiny. In applying the intermediate scrutiny standard, the court
concluded that the state’s objective of “protecting the public and
reducing crime is important and that the law is substantially related to
that objective because, instead of banning all concealed carry, the law
51
provides for case specific assessments of each applicant’s needs.” The
court refused to apply a strict scrutiny standard instead because it
45

Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 8.
Id. (citing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011)).
47
Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 8.
48
Id. at 3 (citing Kachalsky v. Cacace, No. 10-CV-5413, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99837
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011)).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 3-4 (citing Kachalsky, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS at 99837 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011)).
46
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interpreted strict scrutiny to apply only when laws burden what is
52
considered a “core” Second Amendment right. If the Supreme Court in
Heller or McDonald had set a standard for the lower courts to apply,
state and federal courts would not have to struggle on a case-by-case
53
basis to determine which standard is appropriate. Instead, a set
standard would conserve judicial resources and create consistent
holdings throughout every level of the courts.
C. Is Conduct Outside of the Home Protected by the Second
Amendment?
Heller and McDonald only addressed an individual’s right to selfdefense within the home, so the lower courts have had to decide not
only the standard to apply, but also the larger question of whether the
54
Second Amendment protects conduct outside of one’s home. In
evaluating this difficult question, a significant number of courts have
generally concluded that the Second Amendment only protects conduct
55
within the home.
One such court, the Appellate Court of Illinois, decided in People
v. Dawson that it would not expand the rights that the Supreme Court
56
had announced in Heller and McDonald. The plaintiff had been
convicted of “three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm and two
57
counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon.” Plaintiff argued that
the Supreme Court’s decisions should extend to protect a citizen’s
ability to carry a handgun outside of their home in case of
58
confrontation. The Appellate Court was left with the responsibility of
determining the right to bear arms in this case and whether the statute at
59
issue violated the Second Amendment. Noting that the Supreme Court
“deliberately and expressly maintained a controlled pace of essentially
52

Id. at 4.
See e.g. United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, 2010 WL 411112, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 28,
2010) (“The court declines to apply strict scrutiny, since … Heller did not expressly find
firearm possession to be a fundamental right.” (internal citations omitted)). See also Eugene
Volokh, McDonald v. City of Chicago and the Standard of Review for Gun Control Laws,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2010, 3:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/mcdonald-vcity-of-chicago-and-the-standard-of-review-for-gun-control-laws/.
54
Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 9.
55
Id.
56
People v. Dawson, 934 N.E.2d 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
57
Id. at 599 (internal citations omitted).
58
Id. at 604.
59
Id. at 605.
53
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beginning to define this constitutional right[,]” the Appellate Court
nevertheless created its own interpretation of the Second Amendment
60
parameters and construed the statute to be constitutional. The Dawson
court acknowledged that the Heller Court had “specifically limited its
ruling to interpreting the amendment’s protection of the right to possess
handguns in the home, not the right to possess handguns outside of the
61
home in case of confrontation” and tried to use their own discretion to
litigate the issue. Without assistance from the Supreme Court, the
Appellate Court judges were left to “construe statutes to be
62
constitutional when possible” and did not evaluate the plaintiff’s right
in the manner that it could have with guidance from the Supreme Court.
Other courts have similarly held off on deciding whether the
Second Amendment applies outside the home and have found
63
restrictions on firearm possession in public places to be valid. On
March 24, 2011, the Fourth Circuit rejected a claim that there is a
constitutional right to possess a loaded handgun in a car in a national
64
park in United States v. Masciandaro. The majority opinion stated that
the Heller Court did “not define the outer limits of Second Amendment
rights,” and it also “did not address the level of scrutiny that should be
65
applied to laws that burden those rights.” The court further noted that
“a considerable degree of uncertainty remains as to the scope of that
right beyond the home and the standards for determining whether and
66
how the right can be burdened by governmental regulation.” Absent a
standard from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit applied
intermediate scrutiny and held that the government has a “substantial
interest in providing for the safety of individuals who visit and make
67
use of the national parks” and that the statute’s “narrow prohibition is
68
reasonably adapted to that substantial governmental interest.”

60

Id. at 605, 607.
Id. at 605-06.
62
Dawson, 934 N.E.2d at 605.
63
Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 9.
64
Vice, supra note 35, at 3 (citing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir.
2011)).
65
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 466-67.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 473.
68
Id.
61
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Judge Paul V. Niemeyer wrote separately stating that although he
did not believe that a car can constitute a “home,” he felt that a plausible
reading of Heller could be that the Second Amendment nevertheless
provides a right to possess a loaded handgun for self-defense outside the
69
home. His interpretation of Heller “found that the right included the
right to ‘protect [] [oneself] against both public and private violence,’
thus extending the right in some form to wherever a person could
70
become exposed to public or private violence.” Even though he did not
agree with Masciandaro’s contention that a car in which an individual
frequently sleeps can constitute a “home” under Heller, Judge Niemeyer
nevertheless determined that “because ‘self-defense has to take place
wherever [a ]person happens to be,’ it follows that the right extends to
71
public areas beyond the home.” Judge Niemeyer did not read Heller
narrowly to only include self-defense in one’s home, but instead argued
that the right might extend beyond the home. The complex question of
where the right actually applies was not necessarily being decided in
this case, but Judge Niemeyer at the very least believed that the right
could extend to “Masciandaro’s claim to self-defense—asserted by him
as a law-abiding citizen sleeping in his automobile in a public parking
72
area . . . .” However, without any guidance from the Supreme Court,
the Fourth Circuit became yet another lower court that was confined to
applying a lower standard of scrutiny instead of determining exactly
how far the Second Amendment right to bear arms extends outside of
one’s home.
D. How Are State Courts Reacting to the Assault on their Gun
Restriction Statutes?
Ever since the assault on gun restrictions began, state courts have
been forced into litigation to determine which gun statutes are
constitutional. These state courts have handed down decisions that
uphold laws “prohibiting the unlicensed carrying of handguns outside of
the home, authorizing the seizure of firearms in cases of domestic
violence, prohibiting the possession of assault weapons and 50-caliber
rifles, and requiring that an individual possess a license to own a

69
70
71
72

Id. at 467.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (alteration in original).
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 468 (alteration in original).
Id.
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73

handgun.” In upholding these restrictions, the lower state courts have
followed the lead of the federal courts and have been unable to resolve
Heller’s unanswered questions.
In 2011, the Superior Court of New Jersey was presented with a
74
case similar to United States v. Masciandaro. In State v. Robinson, the
defendant was convicted of possessing a handgun without a permit and
75
the court rejected his Second Amendment challenge to this conviction.
The defendant was a truck driver who lived in his truck for many days
due to the distance of his travels; therefore, he argued that his truck was
a home and should be protected under the holdings in Heller and
76
McDonald. The judges were able to resolve the case without
77
determining whether a truck can constitute a legal home. They noted
that Heller and McDonald dealt only with guns inside the home and that
“accept[ing] the defendant’s view of his truck as his second home . . .
78
requires acceptance of an expansive definition of the word ‘home . . .’”
In an effort to avoid deciding how far gun rights extend, the New Jersey
Superior Court left the issue to be decided at a later time.
E. Civil Suits Against State and Local Governments
As of September 1, 2012, states faced fifty significant civil
lawsuits challenging different state gun laws under the Second
79
Amendment. Although Second Amendment challenges in civil suits
have generally been unsuccessful, “several courts have cited Heller in
expressing concern about state action that would limit an individual’s
right to possess a firearm where that person is not prohibited by law
80
from doing so.” Three significant civil cases have acknowledged the
individual right to possess a firearm where the individual is legally
allowed to do so and have joined a minority of cases that have
73

Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 7.
Id.at 2.
75
State v. Robinson, No. A-0280-09T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2274 (App.
Div. Aug. 23, 2011).
76
Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 2.
77
Id. “Even if we were to accept defendant's view of his truck as his second home,
which requires acceptance of an expansive definition of the word home, defendant
acknowledges that he had the handgun and clip in his waistband on his person outside of the
truck on warehouse property.” Robinson, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2274 at *10.
78
Robinson, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2274 at *10.
79
Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, Sept. 1,
2012, at 5.
80
Id. at 5-6.
74
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proactively litigated Second Amendment claims after Heller.
One such civil case is Simmons v. Gillespie, in which a plaintiff
police officer sued a police chief after the chief issued a personnel
memorandum prohibiting the officer “from possessing or carrying
81
firearms without prior authorization from the Chief of Police.” In his
complaint, the officer essentially alleged that the chief had “prohibited
him, as a condition of his employment, from all private, lawful
82
possession and use of firearms.” Even though the officer’s complaint
did not explicitly include a Second Amendment claim, the court
believed “it [was] appropriate, in light of Heller’s recent ruling, to
construe the Complaint as encompassing a Second Amendment claim
83
instead of requiring Plaintiff to file an amended Complaint.” The court
determined that the plaintiff had a claim to injunctive relief and denied
84
the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the Second Amendment claim.
After settlement negotiations, the court in 2010 granted the plaintiff’s
85
Petition for Voluntary Dismissal. The Simmons court, along with
several others, was “expressing concern about state action that would
limit an individual’s right to possess a firearm where that person is not
86
prohibited by law from doing so.” The police chief had tried to limit
the employee police officer’s possession of a firearm where he was
lawfully allowed to have it, and the court found that this was a violation
of the Second Amendment.
In another potential victory for gun rights lobbyists, the United
States District Court for the Central District of Illinois in Mischaga v.
Monken denied the dismissal of a plaintiff’s suit alleging that an Illinois
licensing law “violated the Second Amendment by preventing her from
being able to possess a firearm for self-defense while she stayed in an
87
Illinois friend’s home.” In a complaint against the Director of the
Illinois State Police, the plaintiff alleged that the Illinois Act prohibited
her from possessing a weapon for her personal protection at her
temporary residence in Illinois and that the act therefore violated her
81

Simmons v. Gillespie, No. 08-CV-1068, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81424 (C.D. Ill.
Aug. 1, 2008).
82
Id. at *4.
83
Id. at *5 (emphasis omitted).
84
Id. at *14.
85
Simmons v. Gillespie, No. 08-CV-1068, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75034 (C.D. Ill.,
July 23, 2010).
86
Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 5.
87
Id.
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88

constitutional right to bear arms. The court found that the plaintiff had
89
stated a claim and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. This case
discusses the breadth of the word “home” that was left untouched in
Heller. Since the Supreme Court did not specify how far the right to
self-defense in the “home” extends, it is significant that the District
Court did not dismiss a claim alleging that the right should also be
applied in a temporary home when staying with a friend.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit in Ezell v. City of Chicago examined a
Chicago ordinance to determine whether it violated the plaintiff’s
90
Second Amendment rights. Immediately following the decision in
McDonald, Chicago’s City Council Committee on Police and Fire held
a hearing to explore what possible legislative responses were needed
91
following McDonald. The Committee made recommendations to the
City Council, and just four days after McDonald was handed down,
Chicago’s City Council “repealed the City’s laws banning handgun
possession and unanimously adopted the Responsible Gun Owners
92
Ordinance.” This ordinance mandates a one-hour range training
requirement for anyone who wants to own a gun, yet at the same time, it
93
prohibits any firing ranges from being within city limits. The ordinance
94
further prohibits any handgun possession “outside the home” and
specifies that a gun owner may have “no more than one firearm in his
95
home assembled and operable.”
96
The Seventh Circuit found Heller to be instructive and held that
although the Supreme Court had not specified the appropriate level of
scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment litigation, its interpretation was
97
that Heller required “any heightened standard of scrutiny.” Because
the ordinance “prohibits the ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ of
Chicago from engaging in target practice in the controlled environment

88

Mishaga v. Monken, No. 10-3187, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123491 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 22,

2010).
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id.
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 690.
Id.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 690-691.
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 700.
Id. at 701.
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98

of a firing range,” the court concluded that the city bears the burden,
under this heightened level of scrutiny, of “establishing a strong public99
interest justification for its ban on range training.” The city was
required to “establish a close fit between the range ban and the actual
100
public interest it serves” and also had to prove that the “public
interests are strong enough to justify so substantial an encumbrance on
101
individual Second Amendment rights.” When the city failed to meet
this standard, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with its findings. This case recognized the
Second Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens and did not allow yet
another Chicago ban to be upheld.
F. Going Forward: Further Challenges in Lower Courts
In the future, gun lobbyists will likely continue to threaten courts
with more litigation in an effort to keep state and local governments
102
across the country from enacting more statutes that restrict gun rights.
Proponents of increased gun rights have been lining up cases to go to
the Supreme Court that will force the Court to clarify whether the
103
Second Amendment applies outside the context of the home.
One such case that recently came up before the Supreme Court is
the appeal of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
104
Masciandaro. In his petition to the Supreme Court, Sean Masciandaro
argued that “[i]f there is a Second Amendment right outside of the
home, it surely applies to law-abiding citizens carrying handguns for
105
self-defense while traveling on public highways.” Masciandaro
originally pled his case in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
front of Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III, who stated that “any expansion
106
of the right in [Heller] would have to come from the Supreme Court.”
Alan Gura, the litigator who argued the Heller case, wrote an amicus
brief supporting Masciandaro’s appeal and stated that Masciandaro’s
98

Id. at 708.
Id.
100
Id. at 708-709.
101
Id. at 709.
102
Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 9.
103
Barnes, supra note 6, at 2-3.
104
United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80
U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2011) (No. 10-11212).
105
Barnes, supra note 6, at 2 (internal quotations omitted).
106
Id.
99
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case “provides the perfect chance to ‘clarify’ for recalcitrant lower
courts that the Second Amendment ‘applies beyond the threshold of
107
one’s home.’” Although the Supreme Court did not take this
opportunity to clarify its Heller decision, Mr. Gura believes that there
108
will surely be more cases like it forthcoming.
III.

Legislative Response: “Guns-at-Work” State Laws Expand
Gun Rights for Employees

Rather than bringing cases before the lower courts in the hopes of
reaching the Supreme Court, lobbyists for the legislatures responded to
the Heller decision by enacting state “Guns-at-Work” laws. These state
laws “prohibit employers or business owners from forbidding the
presence of otherwise legal guns in locked motor vehicles parked on
109
business premises. Since these laws are not preempted by the federal
OSH Act, the nineteen states that have enacted the “Guns-at-Work”
laws have essentially expanded gun rights through legislative enactment
rather than judicial ruling. While the Supreme Court has declined to
reach the issue of individual gun rights outside of the home, the state
legislatures have tackled the issue head on and have given individuals
the right to carry an otherwise lawful weapon for self-defense outside of
the home.
A. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 Proves
Inadequate and Ambiguous
When looking at state legislatures’ reactions to Heller and the
“Guns-at-Work” laws, we must also look at the federal regulations that
these laws were meant to clarify, most notably the Federal Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (“OSH Act”). When Congress enacted
the OSH Act in 1970, its restrictions brought the federal government
110
into an area that generally was controlled by the states. Congress
enacted the law because it wanted to ensure that employees experienced
111
safe and healthy working conditions. Consequently, the Act imposed
107

Id.
Id. at 2-3.
109
Witter, supra note 10, at 240.
110
Dayna B. Royal, Take Your Gun to Work and Leave It in the Parking Lot: Why the
OSH Act Does Not Preempt State Guns-at-Work Laws, 61 FLA. L. REV. 475, 486 (2009)
(quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992)).
111
Id. at 486.
108
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on employers an obligation to maintain workplace safety. The two
main obligations that the Act imposed on employers were compliance
with health and safety standards and compliance with the Act’s “general
113
duty clause.” This “general duty clause” imposes on every employer a
duty to “‘furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or
114
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.’”
The “general duty clause” creates a mandatory requirement for
employers and functions as a “catch all” for any workplace hazards that
are not covered by a specific Occupational Safety and Health
115
Administration (“OSHA”) regulation.
In the context of gun rights, the main speculation about this
“general duty clause” is whether or not workplace violence prevention
is required under the clause. Some courts, such as the court in
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, have found that “‘gun-related workplace
violence and the presence of unauthorized firearms on company
property’” qualify as recognized hazards that come under the
116
employer’s general duty. The District Court ruled that the employer’s
general duty applied because if guns are not banned from the premises,
including parking lots, disgruntled employees can easily retrieve
117
firearms. However, in Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the ConocoPhillips holding and
ruled that the OSHA “has not indicated in any way that employers
118
should prohibit firearms from company parking lots.” The court held
that the OSHA had “declined a request to promulgate a standard
119
banning firearms from the workplace” and although the OSHA is
aware of the controversy surrounding firearms in the workplace, they
120
have “consciously decided not to adopt a standard.”
Though it would appear that the state “Guns-at-Work” laws
112

Id. at 487.
Id.
114
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)).
115
Perry, supra note 8, at 3.
116
Id. at 4 (quoting ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F.Supp. 2d 1282, 1328 (N.D.
Okla. 2007)).
117
Id.
118
Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2009) (emphasis
omitted).
119
Id. (emphasis omitted).
120
Id. (emphasis omitted).
113
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conflict with the OSH Act’s “general duty clause,” that is not the case.
Employers cannot prevent the random, intentional acts of employees
and although the OSHA is concerned with increasing workplace safety,
121
random acts of violence are not workplace specific. In an attempt to
clarify any discrepancies regarding workplace violence, the OSHA
advised in a letter of interpretation exactly what it meant by the “general
122
duty clause.” The letter stated that where the risk of violence is a
“recognized hazard,” the employer should take reasonable steps to
minimize such foreseen risks and would be in violation of the OSH Act
123
if he or she did not. On the other hand, the random occurrences of
violent acts that are not seen as a characteristic of the type of
124
employment do not subject an employer to an OSH Act violation. This
letter suggests that employers would not face liability if they had taken
reasonable steps of abatement, such as installing metal detectors in their
buildings to prevent guns from coming in places where workplace
125
violence is reasonably foreseeable. Gun activists believe that
interpreting the OSH Act this way proves not only that the “general
duty clause” does not require banning guns from employee vehicles, but
also that the state “Guns-at-Work” laws are not preempted by the
“general duty clause” of the OSH Act.
B. State Legislatures Take a Stand: State “Guns-at-Work” Laws
1. “Guns-at-Work” Laws in General
The spread of “‘parking lot’” or “bring your gun to work” laws
stems in part from the landmark Heller decision that struck down
126
Washington, D.C.’s handgun ban. Some businesses and employers
remain unsure about the future of their potential liability, as the
“policies designed to ensure safe workplaces clash with the Second

121

Royal, supra note 110, at 520-21.
Id. at 521.
123
Id. (quoting Letter from Roger A. Clark, Dir., Directorate of Enforcement Programs,
Occupational Safety and Health Admin., to John R. Schuller (Dec. 10, 1992),
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS
&p_id=20951).
124
Id.
125
Royal, supra note 110, at 522.
126
Stephanie Armour, A ‘Bring Your Gun to Work’ Movement Builds, BUSINESSWEEK,
Mar.
31,
2011,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_15/b4223038869200.htm.
122
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127

Amendment.” Employers continue to raise concerns both with their
duties under the broad “general duty clause” of the OSH Act and also
with their potential civil liability exposure if an employee is involved in
128
workplace violence. In spite of this uncertainty, some state legislatures
129
took a stand for gun rights and passed “Guns-at-Work” laws. These
laws have been divided into two categories: the laws with more severe
130
restrictions and the laws with weaker exceptions. The states with the
most severe restrictions include Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
131
Minnesota, and Oklahoma. These states generally forbid employers
from asking employees whether or not they have a gun inside their car,
from prohibiting a person that is legally entitled to possess a firearm
locked in their vehicle from doing so, and from implementing a policy
that would limit an employee’s ability to store a firearm in their locked
132
vehicle. At the other end of the spectrum, ten states have exceptions to
the “Guns-at-Work” laws and give employers more leeway in their
133
restrictions on employees. These states include Alaska, Arizona,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio, and
134
Utah.
2. Oklahoma’s “Guns-at-Work” Law
Oklahoma’s strict “Guns-at-Work” restrictions have been in the
spotlight during much of the controversy over these state enactments.
Oklahoma originally enacted its “Guns-at-Work” statute in response to
a corporation that fired eight workers at a timber mill in southeastern
Oklahoma who had guns in their vehicles at the mill in violation of
135
company policy. A principle author of the gun-rights law, Senator
Jerry Ellis, stated that angry workers who shoot people in the workplace

127

Id.
“Bring Your Gun to Work” Laws & Their Effect on Employers (HRM Partners),
June
26,
2011,
http://hrm-partners.com/hr-news/%e2%80%9cbring-your-gun-towork%e2%80%9d-laws-their-effect-on-employers.
129
Id.
130
Id. When this publication was written, Maine had not yet joined the other sixteen
legislatures in passing the “Guns-at-work” law.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
HRM Partners, supra note 128.
135
Robert Boczkiewicz, Gun Law Gets its Day in Court, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 20, 2008,
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?articleID20081120_11_A1_DENVER94063.
128
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136

“are going to do so no matter what laws are enacted.”
Oklahoma’s “Guns-at-Work” law has sparked much controversy
and litigation. In the case of Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit “unanimously ruled that workers
in Oklahoma have the constitutional right to keep guns in their vehicles
137
parked on their employers’ parking lots.” Originally, a group of
employers had filed a lawsuit arguing that the state laws violated the
regulations of the OSH Act and although the district court in 2007
agreed, the Tenth Circuit held that the OSHA regulations are just
“voluntary guidelines and recommendations for employers seeking to
138
reduce the risk of workplace violence in at-risk industries.” Because of
the number of cases that have already surrounded the “Guns-at-Work”
laws, it is no surprise that labor and employment attorney James P.
Anelli predicts that, even though this decision was a victory for
employees in the Tenth Circuit, there will be even more cases down the
139
road where employees will fight for their constitutional right. Anelli
proposes that in states without the “Guns-at-Work” laws, employees
may argue “that he or she has a constitutional right to carry a firearm in
a vehicle [in an employer parking lot], particularly in a state where it’s
140
legal to carry a firearm in one’s vehicle.” In order to avoid the
continued litigation on the subject, the Supreme Court needs to make a
ruling that either affirms or denies an individual’s right to bear arms not
only locked in their vehicle at work, but also outside of the home in
general.
3. Florida’s Legislation
Akin to Oklahoma, Florida adopted “Guns-at-Work” legislation
that severely limits the restrictions employers can place on employees
regarding guns in locked vehicles in company parking lots. Prior to
141
adopting this legislation, the bill’s sponsor, Rep. Dennis Baxley,
argued that the bill was simply “an extension of the Second Amendment
rights” and was “meant to protect employees during their commute to
136

Id.
Lydell C. Bridgeford, Court Rejects Ban on Guns in Workplace Parking Lots,
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, June 15, 2009, http://ebn.benefitnews.com/news/court-rejectbans-on-guns-in-workplace-parking-lots-2681024-1.html.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
H.B. 129, 108th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006).
137
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and from their place of business.” Baxley, the owner of a company
with close to seventy employees, further explained that although he
understood the concerns business owners had, he didn’t believe that the
employer’s property rights could trump the individual’s Second
143
Amendment rights to self-protection. In 2008, the Florida “Guns-at144
Work” statute was enacted. It specifically “prohibits employers from
preventing customers, employees, or invitees from possessing legally
owned firearms locked in vehicles in parking lots when lawfully in the
145
area.” Under the statute, employers cannot take action against
employees based on statements about firearms they may have in their
vehicles, and employers cannot condition employment on an agreement
146
not to maintain such firearms.
147
In Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Florida was asked to determine whether
148
Florida’s “Guns-at-Work” statute was preempted by the OSH Act.
Finding that the statute was not preempted, the district court concluded
149
that the OSH Act applies to permit the states to regulate and generally
acknowledged that state laws can be used to decide any occupational
150
safety or heath issue when there is no controlling federal standard.
This is extremely important because the court essentially ruled that the
OSH Act left the task of governing the possession of guns in the
workplace to the states. Because there is not a federal standard
“governing the prevention of workplace violence relevant to ‘guns-at151
work’ laws,” the statute as enacted in Florida is permitted.

142
Kasey Wehrum, Debate Rages Over Guns at Work: A New Bill That Would Forbid
Employers From Banning Guns is Drawing Fire, INC., Feb. 10, 2006,
http://www.inc.com/news/articles/200602/guns.html.
143
Id.
144
Fla. Stat. §790.251(4)(a) (2010).
145
Royal, supra note 110, at 496 (quoting Fla. Stat §790.251(4)(a) (2010)).
146
Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. §790.251(4)(a) (2010)).
147
576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
148
Royal, supra note 110, at 505.
149
Id. at 506 (quoting Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298-99).
150
Id. at 508 (see 29 U.S.C. §667 (a) and Occupational and Safety and Health Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, §18(a)).
151
Id.
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4. Indiana: Parking Lot 2.0
Despite criticism from businesses and major employers, Indiana’s
“Guns-at-Work” statute went into effect on July 1, 2010 after sailing
152
through both legislative chambers. Indiana Governor Mitchel Daniels
stated that he signed the legislation because of the “clear gun-rights
language in federal and state constitutions and the ‘overwhelming
153
consensus’ in the House and Senate.” He did, however, add that the
General Assembly “might consider ironing out ambiguities to prevent
154
unnecessary litigation.” Unlike the Supreme Court, Daniels wanted to
clarify any unanswered questions that the legislation would bring about
in order to save judicial resources.
In 2011, the NRA pushed for new legislation that would allow
employers “to be sued if they require applicants to disclose information
about gun ownership or require employees to reveal if they have
155
weapons or ammunition in their cars.” The bill was authored by State
Senator Johnny Nugent and labeled “the Parking Lot 2.0 bill” by the
156
NRA. Senator Nugent explained his support of the bill by stating that
although he understands why employers feel the way they do, there are
“things that trump property rights, and one of them is the defense of
157
[my] life.” The 2010 bill failed to specifically address what employers
could do “to find out if their workers had guns in their cars, or what
158
action they could take to verify those guns were legally permitted.”
Employers were taking advantage of the vague statute and creating
separate parking areas for employers who carried guns to work in their
cars and even began asking employees for more information about the
159
guns that they were bringing. The NRA lobbyists argued that citizens
“have a constitutional right to self-protection that doesn’t stop when

152
Norm Heikens, What’s next for guns at work, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J., Mar. 19, 2010,
http://www.ibj.com/newstalk/2010/03/19/newstalk-template/PARAMS/post/18801.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Maureen Hayden, Challenges Arise to Indiana’s ‘Parking Lot’ Gun Law: Bill
Targets Employers Who Demand Info From Employees, TRIBSTAR, Jan. 28, 2011,
http://tribstar.com/indianalegislature/x135630126/Challenges-arise-to-Indiana-s-parking-lotgun-law.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.

FORSEY NOTE_FORMATTED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

434

6/14/2013 12:57 AM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 37:2

160

they drive onto their employer’s property” and subsequently pushed
for the more restrictive “Parking Lot 2.0” bill. On April 15, 2011,
Governor Daniels signed into law the Senate Enrolled Act 411 (known
161
as the “Parking Lot 2.0” bill).
Indiana’s new employee protection legislation “prevents workplace
discrimination for those employees who exercise their Second
162
Amendment rights before and after work.” With this new statute,
businesses and employers can no longer ask their employees about
“private firearm ownership habits or what firearms or ammunition they
own or transport in their vehicle” and cannot force “vehicle searches
163
and the registration of employee firearm serial numbers.” There was
no serious opposition for the new bill in the state Senate or House, and
164
it went into effect on July 1, 2011. By enacting this statute, the state
legislature stood up for Second Amendment rights of employees to
protect themselves on their commute to and from work.
IV.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court Needs to Take an
Affirmative Stance

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution states “a
well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
165
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
There are two different ways that citizens have interpreted these words:
(1) that individuals have an unfettered right to own firearms; or (2) that
states are merely able to maintain militias in order to protect against a
166
tyrannical federal government. Until 2008, the Supreme Court had not
ruled on this controversy. However, in Heller, the Court held that the
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms. This
brought about not only increasing gun rights litigation, but also
numerous state laws giving employees the right to store otherwise legal
160

Id.
Indiana: Governor Mitch Daniels Signs “Parking Lot 2.0” Bill Into Law!,
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, Apr. 19,
2011,
http://www.nraila.org/legislation/state-legislation/2011/4/indiana-governor-mitchdaniels-signs%E2%80%9C.aspx?s=%22Parking+Lot%2FEmployee+Protection%22&st=&ps=.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
U.S. Const. amend. II.
166
Perry, supra note 8, at 5.
161
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handguns in their vehicles when parked in their employer’s private lots.
Gun-rights lobbyists believe that Heller supports an expansive reading
of the Second Amendment, and have been attempting to convince
167
judges and state legislatures to read the decision expansively as well.
The Heller and McDonald decisions have played key roles in both the
state “Guns-at-Work” statutes and the recent litigation that continues to
challenge gun restrictions nationwide. If not for both of these decisions,
advocates of the “Guns-at-Work” laws would not have much of a leg to
stand on when arguing their rights under the Second Amendment.
Even with legislative enactments expanding gun rights at the
workplace, the Supreme Court needs to better define Second
Amendment rights in order to put an end to the costly litigation created
by Heller’s unanswered questions. If the Supreme Court meant its two
holdings to apply beyond possession of a firearm in one’s home, it will
168
need to state that outright rather than avoid the subject. It was clear
from the moment the decision was handed down that “much litigation
would be needed to define the contours of Justice Antonin Scalia’s
169
majority opinion in Heller.” The Supreme Court cannot simply give a
limited definition to Second Amendment rights and then wait while the
lower courts argue back and forth, draining judicial resources and
providing inconsistent holdings. After taking a stance in both Heller and
McDonald, the Supreme Court needs to take their holding a step further
and define how far the right to bear arms extends outside of the home.
During the ongoing litigation stemming from Heller and
McDonald, state legislatures in Indiana, Florida, Oklahoma, and
fourteen other states have chosen not to rely on previous federal
enactments such as the OSH Act and instead have created their own
statutes that protect gun rights for self-defense outside of the home.
They have chosen to take the power that the Supreme Court has so far
refused to exercise and have expanded Second Amendment rights to
include self-defense outside of the home by permitting employees to
possess guns in their car during their commute to the workplace.
Currently, nineteen states have “Guns-at-Work” statutes and there is no
telling what other legislation will come into effect due to pressures from
gun rights activists. With this type of disconnect between judicial
rulings and the legislatures’ approaches, it is important that the Supreme
167
168
169

Witter, supra note 10, at 240.
Barnes, supra note 6.
Id.
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Court accept one of the many cases being petitioned before it and take
the opportunity to define exactly how far the individual’s right to bear
arms extends. Due to the overwhelming need for clarification in the
judicial branch, the Supreme Court needs to follow the state
legislatures’ example and take an affirmative position on this significant
Second Amendment issue.

